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The Big Lie: Saudi Arabia is USA Ally


Recently, President Trump called Saudi Arabia an important ally. Most analysts saw it as another Trump exaggeration for political consumption. Then General Mattis called Saudi Arabia an important ally and that has a much different meaning. An ally is a country with mutual support agreements and who backs up that commitment in action. Allies do not work against each other. With General Mattis calling Saudi Arabia an ally, it implies that America’s military will be deployed to defend and possibly die for that ally.

What is Saudi Arabia?

It is reported that Australian Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull asked President Obama, “Are the Saudis your friends?”

President Obama responded, “It’s complicated.”

Lets clear the table of the largest piece of FICTION: The United States needs Saudi Arabia for oil.

FALSE. Saudi Arabia is a minor player in terms of imported oil into the United States. Canada is the kingpin and is the country Trump should not be insulting. It provides between 40 to 50 percent of America’s imported oil on a daily basis at above 3.3 million plus barrels a day. In 2017, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela sat within a few 100 thousand barrels per day of each other. In 2018, United States domestic crude oil production escalated to the point that America became an exporter.
Saudi Arabia is not a strategic ally in terms of oil supply.

An ally supports the United States in conflicts with shared values.

FALSE for Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia refused to send troops to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. For the Record, Iran supported Operation Enduring Freedom but not Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia refused to send troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

Saudi Arabia refused to support the operation in Libya in 2011. Jordan, Qatar, and UAE supported the operation, but not the Saudis.

Saudi Arabia did support the effort in Syria against the Islamic State but at the same time Saudi Arabia was funneling weapons to a wide range of Sunni Jihadi groups in Syria who supplied those weapons to the Islamic State. Does that sound like an ally?

Allies share military bases for strategic reasons.

FALSE for Saudi Arabia. The kingdom, in 2003 when the United States needed an airbase in the region, closed Prince Sultan Air Base to US jets because it feared angering the al Qaeda supporters in Saudi royal family.

In that vein, allies do not fund your enemy. But Saudi Arabia funded al Qaeda, the group that attacked the World Trade Center and killed over 2,000 Americans. In a confidential United States Treasury report Saudi Arabia’s royal family was found to be a significant funder of al-Qaeda between the 1990’s and 2006. They funded the International Islamic Relief Organization as a front to fund worldwide terrorism.

Allies do not work against other United States allies.

FALSE. For the last three years Saudi Arabia has boycotted Qatar the site of America’s Al Udeid Airbase and significantly hurt the relationship between the United States and Qatar. This only displays that Saudi Arabia does not see the United States as an ally and will act in its own self interest.

Obviously, General Mattis missed all these facts in his rush to protect Saudi Arabia’s human rights abuses. But then General Mattis gave his reason for the sudden rush to embrace his new “ally”. “The United States needs Saudi Arabia in its fight against Iran.

Really? How did General Mattis get the name the Scholar General? General Mattis’ position is that the United States needs the Saudi Army to fight off Iran. Did I hear that right? The same Saudi army that has been struggling for years against the rag tag, starved, Houthis in Yemen? The Saudi army with zero combat experience—save for the Yemen disaster—is going against a battle hardened Iranian army with experience against Iraq and seven years in Syria. The Saudi army is going against Hezbollah with the IRGC who are possibly pound for pound some of the best fighters in the world? Hezbollah who fought Israel to a stand-still in Lebanon.

Maybe General Mattis plans on support form Egypt? The Egyptian army has more experience killing its own citizens than another army. The Egyptian army that can not handle bands of bedouins—“terrorists”–in the Sinai. Maybe Mattis is planning on support from the Emirates, whose major cities and airfields are within artillery range from Iran.

Of course, there is always Israel to take on Iran. Israel whose army is pinned down in a brutal occupation of the West Bank, pinned down guarding the Gaza border, pinned down watching Hezbollah in Lebanon and with 30 percent of its population refusing military service. The freedom fighters of 1967 are long gone in Israel and the current Israeli soldier has more experience arresting children and slapping around women than fighting armed soldiers.

Saudi Arabia is NOT an ally. It is America’s best weapons customer. Some 20% of America’s weapons prior to Trump have gone to Saudi Arabia.

General Mattis has turned the United States military into a mercenary force to protect the wealthy military industrial complex.

William Church

Editor

Islamic World Books

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Debunking Three Syrian Civil War Myths




Myth #1

Climate Change caused the Syrian War and its correlative support statement. Daraa was the center of the opposition.

This myth has been repeated universally to the point that some academics include it in their research. A close examination shows the drought of 2005 to 2007 was a factor but it was a minor factor compared to other, larger issues. Charles Lister in his seminal work The Syrian Jihad reminds all analysts that prior to the Arab Spring there was a Damascus Spring in 2000, with Bashar Assad’s ascension to power bringing the promise of reform and visible movement towards economic reform.

These reforms, according to Lister and others, accentuated the existing corruption that clogged the economic wheels of Syria. In addition, Assad started reducing military expenditure, diverting the funds to economic reforms, though greatly hampered by George W. Bush administration sanctions; therefore, creating a weaker military comprised mostly of Alewite officers commanding some 200,000 Sunni conscripts.

It is important to add another disastrous George W. Bush action that fueled both the demonstrations and the rebellion: the 2003 Iraq invasion. The Iraq invasion fueled the hope of the Kurdish population spread across Syria, Iraq, and Turkey. (The Battle for Syria: Christopher Philips)Though, Daraa broke into revolt on 15 March 2011, the northern area ofAl-Hasakah (largely Kurdish area) saw the first Arab Spring-like action when Hasan Ali Akleh set himself on fire. This was followed by imprisoned Kurdish activists demanding freedom and demonstrations five days before Daraa in Qamishli and al-Hasakah.

A full month before Daraa, the mythological start of the revolt, shopkeepers in Damascus’ famous Souq al-Hamadiyya protested before being joined by 5,000 other Damascene. In addition, there were constant calls for Days of Rage nationwide prior to Daraa.

The American invasion of Iraq had a much larger fatal impact. As discussed by Lister and others, it served as a magnet to Sunni Jihadis from Syria and other parts of the region who would later return to Syria armed, trained, and battle-ready. Ahrar Al-Sham, Saudi funded, would show up in one of the first battles in 2011. Al Qaeda’s al-Nusra would show more caution during 2011 but by mid-2012, as the United States sponsored Free Syrian Army faded, it assumed a leadership role in the revolt.

In terms of armed revolt, Daraa was the third battle of the revolt behind Rastan and Rif Dimashq some two months earlier. In even further contrast, Adam Baczko et al in Civil War in Syria cites June as the first battle of the Syrian Civil War. However, without doubt the March 2011 incidents in Daraa were most sensational and exploitable by the news media because they involved children and provided the best news copy with a Syrian official supposedly telling the families to go make more children and if their husbands could not his men would help. (By now it is fairly certain this never happened.)

In a small concession to the Climate Change theory—borne out of the drought—Baczko points out that largely the non-Free Syrian Army-rebels were from the disaffected countryside. However, the Climate Change theory displays the lack of understanding of Syrian history as described in Philip Khoury’s Urban Notables of Syria. The conflict between the wealthy Damascene landowners and merchants, who controlled the politics of both Ottoman and post-Ottoman Syria, and the rural population by far is the greatest shaper of the events of 2011.

Why is busting this myth important? To cite the March 2011 Daraa events or Climate Change as the cause of the war negates the complexity of Syrian dynamics. No doubt, it played into President Obama’s simpleton approach of arming the Free Syrian Army as a means to bring about regime change and ignoring the much deeper division in Syria. The Syrian Civil War, only on the surface, was about regime military deserters to be exploited by the United States. The Free Syrian Army, rightfully, fell apart within its first seven months as evidence of the greater dynamics. This President Obama and Hilary Clinton blunder ultimately would aid in the death of nearly 500,000 Syrians.

Myth #2

Iran must be countered in the region to stop Iranian regional expansion.

Over 40 years ago, a high-level Vietnamese government official, who was tired of the American led war, responded to the typical United States government tirade about how the United States was fighting to stop Chinese domination with the following:

“If you believe you are here to stop the Chinese then why don’t you go to China and fight them and leave us alone.”

As a young intelligence analyst in Vietnam, this analyst had a similar response after hearing the Domino Theory at a staff meeting.

“Do you know the history between Vietnam and China?”

Therefore, the United States policy in the Levant can only be described as insane when insanity is described as doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result. The United States needs to learn that nationalism trumps everything. It is for this reason the so-called scholar-General Mattis needs to be placed in the same dunce class as General McChristianson of Vietnam infamy.

First, any rookie-Middle East student knows the area known as Greater Syria is the historical home of Arab Nationalism. This has been well-described in The Great Syrian Revolt by Michael Provence or in The Commander by Lila Parson recounting the struggles of the great (if not ill-fated) Fawzi al-Qawuqji. It is for this reason the Balfour Declaration, in Greater Syria, is considered a supreme act of betrayal by the powers that now wants to control the destiny of Great Syria.

First, it is important to face one ugly truth: Iran did not suddenly appear in Syria in 2011. After the collapse of Soviet empire in 1990, Syria was in need of another benefactor. George W. Bush shut the door on any United States influence in Syria with sanctions. Syria had supported Iran against Iraq during their ten year war so the governments were already bonded. President Obama opened the door again in 2010 until he was pressured by Susan Rice and Secretary State Clinton to change the United States strategy to regime change.

As far as politically dominating Syria, a review of the events in Iraq bears close examination. Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr sets the best model. University of Exeter’s Muhanad Seloom has written that Sadr’s views on Iraqi Nationalism undermines any Iran’s influence. This belies the idea pushed by the United States Intelligence Community that Iran will form a Shia block and control the region. This author conducted extensive interviews in Lebanon during 2017 and found a similar view of Iran in Lebanon.

Why? This is a region that has struggled to gain control of their own destiny for over a hundred years. It is not logical to assume that suddenly Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq would suddenly become Iranian client states. Finally, one must listen to the words of Iran’s President Rouhani when he describes the relationship with the region as cooperative and not dominating.

Second, much has been made of Iran’s need to connect Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon for military supplies. The United States has acted on this exaggerated belief by building an “observation” post at al-Tanf claiming its purpose is to monitor the Islamic State, which is ridiculous since the Islamic State today is largely confined to small pockets in the Syrian desert to the south. Al-Tanf, with over 4,000 American troops, has been established on the Iraq-Syria border to monitor Iranian land movements.

This land connection was vital during the period of 2014-2018 when Iran had an active involvement in the Syrian War but today “Air Hezbollah” lands on the hour at Beirut’s Rafic Harir International Airport. In addition, Iran and Russian, thanks to aggressive United States foreign policy, now have a joint military agreement which allows Russia access to the Iranian airbase at Noyeh, Iran in exchange for continued use of the Syrian base commonly called T4.

It would not be a stretch to suggest that the United States involvement in the Syrian War has been the greatest aid to Iranian integration in the region with Iran/Hezbollah controlling the PMU forces in Iraq, Hezbollah emboldened in the region, and Assad in critical debt both economically and militarily to Iran. Finally, the United States has “bet the farm” on its relationship with the Kurds as a regional wedge. This bet will fail because the Kurds are ultimately pragmatic. They know eventually the United States will go away and they must live within the regional relationships or be at perpetual war.

Only the clinically insane would assume that 4,000 troops, stranded like sitting ducks on the Iraq-Syria border, had any military purpose except to provoke further conflict. It dredges up images of Bien Dien Phu and Khe Sanh.

Myth #3

Two parts to this myth: the Islamic State was a threat to the world and second the United States is in Syria to stop this threat.

This analyst believes the Islamic State, after thorough academic study, will be exposed as a fluke of history and a limited threat. This academic review has just begun with Max Abrahms’ recent publication of Rules for Rebels: the science of victory in militant history and The Master Plan:ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory by Brian Fishman.

Fishman goes to the heart of the Islamic State’s myth with the conquest of Mosul when he describes it as “ISIS did not actually fight its way into Mosul…the (Iraqi) army collapsed. He also reported that Mosul’s residents initially welcomed the Islamic State under the mistaken belief they would offer them protection. Abrahms equally savages the Islamic State when he supports President Obama’s initial assessment as the “JV” team, meaning not a prime fighting force.

Abrahms cites the Islamic State’s leader al-Baghdadi as described by Jayish al-Mujahideen leader Abu Abdullah Mohamed al-Mansour in The Islamic State: Disentangling Myth from Reality as being a “mental mediocrity with with limited intelligence”.

When the final history of the Islamic State is written it will be discovered as a hoax as a world threat. It claimed terrorist attacks that it had not organized, coordinated, or funded. Most of the territory it held was vast uninhabited desert and its second major urban territory—Raqqa—could also be described as a set-up since the Syrian government’s forces were conveniently diverted by a United States and Saudi funded war.

In addition, there are gaping questions regarding support for the Islamic State by Israel and even the United States, with documented incidents of United States resources being used to evacuate Islamic State fighters to safe havens and the significant discovery of United States-origin weapons in its arsenal. It has even been suggested that towards the later stages of the effective fighting life of the Free Syrian Army it was a conduit for the resupply of various Jihadi forces ranging from al-Nusra to the Islamic State.

In reality, the Islamic State collapsed almost as fast as it grew. Its purpose had been achieved; provide the United States an excuse to enter the war.

William Church
Editor
Islamic World Books


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Lawfare and Brookings:Anticipating the next Islamic State

It is impossible to overstate how far a field this article by Daniel Byman in Lawfare has gone. However, it simply reveals how little academic scholarship has been done about the Syrian Civil War. Besides Lister’s Syrian Jihad and Baszko’s recent Civil War in Syria there is a dark hole of validated research.

The article asks if there will be another Islamic State and then cites the global rush to the Islamic State and its ability to take territory as prime examples. Sadly, both of these views have been debunked by Max Abrahms in his recent Rules for Rebels (Oxford University Press). He demonstrates that the Islamic State was the “JV” team as preferred to by President Obama. The Islamic State was a fluke of history and today there remains significant questions around its funding, origination, who supported it on the battlefield, and if it had external support from Israel (and United States).

On more than one occassion, as pointed out by Abrahms the Islamic State overstated its reach claiming many attacks as theirs. As to holding territory, it flatly did not. It took two major cities: Raqqa and Mosul. The remaing of its “territory was vast patches of largely uninhabited territory in Iraq and Syria. Both the sacking of Mosul and Raqqa were flukes of history. Mosul because of the weak Iraqi government and Raqqa because of the raging Syrian Civil War which the United States and Gulf nations funded. Neither demonstrated brillance of military tactics or leadership.

As to its example of drawing worldwide fighters, this verges on laughable if we are talking about experienced Jihadis. Groups like Ahrar al-Sham and Al-Nusra were far more effective and this is not even considering the Mujahideen groups that came to Syria. The Syrian Civil War attracted Jihadis from the Levant because of years of ground work laid prior to 2011. It attracted global Jihadis to Syria because of a desire to drive the United States from the region.

Finally, even asking this question begs Mr. Byman’s understanding of military Jihad. It negates the resevoir of global distrust against foreign intervention in the Islamic World. It negates that justice is a core principle of Islam.

Therefore, the answer is simple. Yes, as long as the United States interfers in the Levant there will be militant Jihadis called to service.

William Church

Editor

Islamic World Books

Was Syria different? Anticipating the next Islamic State
— Read on www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/11/20/was-syria-different-anticipating-the-next-islamic-state/amp/

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Debunking USA Terrorism Strategy: Rules for Rebels by Max Abrahms



Without any doubt Max Abrahms’ Rules for Rebels: the science of victory in militant history should be on the bookshelf of every intelligence analyst and terrorism expert and anyone waging war against a government. Sadly, it is doubtful it will impact government policy of nations like the United States.

Rules for Rebels systematically lays out the three basic rules for rebel leaders.

  • Learn the difference between legitimate power and terrorism and terrorism will hinder your goals.
  • Build a centralized organization, with effective leadership, that restrains the lower level members from using terror as a tactic.
  • If individuals or affiliate groups commitment terrorism then rebel leaders should immediately distance themselves from the act of terrorism.

Through out the book, Abrahms makes a strong case that terrorism does not work for legitimate rebels. Acts like civilian hostage taking or purposed attacks on civilians drive governments to extreme and hinder any negotiation position. The most current example is the Islamic State which he confirms President Obama’s view: they were the “JV” team of terrorists.

Hezbollah is used as an example of a group that transitioned away from terrorism–if one believes it bombed the Argentine Jewish Community Center–to an effective fighting force solely focused on the state of Israel and defense of Lebanon. In this transition, Hezbollah gained political legitimacy and political cover. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is another example of the same impact as well as South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC).

However, for this to be an effective position, the rebel leaders need to control the message. Governments increasingly are incorrectly labeling rebels as terrorists. Abrahms calls this effort “Lumpers”, governments who want to lump all acts of rebels in the terrorism category. The United States is the largest ‘lumper”. Rules for Rebels demonstrates that Al Qaeda lost its effectiveness by its lack of centralized control and second by its use of terrorism.

The core effort for an effective leader must be to built an organization that bridges the gap between the professionalism of the leadership and individualized priorities of the rank and file. Abrahms calls this the “principal-agent” problem. Rank and file are usually less educated than leaders and less politically motivated. The solution is to build a high level of control and education towards the rank and file, much like a standing government army would attempt.

However readable the first two-thirds of the book, Abrahms saves the real message for the last third. The United States’ policy of “decapitation”, selectively assassinating leaders, usually by drone, is both ineffective and and counterproductive. Abrahms clearly demonstrates, by citing examples like the Taliban, that decapitaiton had limited impact and gave rise to increased violence in Afghanistan and did not halt Taliban recruitment. Israel’s targeting of leaders of the Al Aqsa Brigade in the Second Intifada had the same impact and led to increased civilian death.

Rules for Rebels is that rare academic study that hits the problems of today with a frontal assault with both clarity of writing and research.

Rules for Rebels published by Oxford University Press ISBN 978-0-19-881155-8